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Abstract: 
The introduction of choice has resulted in Australia’s superannuation system 
providing unprecedented flexibility (through increased investment options and the 
timing choices) for members to optimise their expected benefits. This paper 
examines the impact of switching between investment options using a normalised 
ranked return or “roulette wheel” approach developed by Bauer and Dahlquist 
(2001) for the Australian setting. The paper tests various switching strategies for 
both single-sector and blended options, for the period 1985–2005, finding that 
members require forecast accuracy of aro u n d  7 0 %  t o  b e  s u c c e s s f u l  a t  m a r k e t  
timing. Finally, the paper considers the impact of switching strategies on 
accumulated balances. 
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 On switching (or market timing): “I don’t know anyone who’s ever got it right. 
In fact, I don’t know anyone who knows anyone who’s ever got it right.” — 
Jack Bogle, Founder, The Vanguard Group Inc. 
 
Superannuation choice has undoubtedly resulted in heightened competition between 
superannuation fund providers, with more than five million employees in Australia’s 
workforce now able to participate actively in decisions about the management of their 
retirement savings.
1 Competition has brought changes in many areas of the industry, 
from reductions in management expense ratios and administrative charges, to greater 
services for members and increased product features. Turning specifically to the focus of 
investigation in this study — product features — two of the interesting developments in 
the recent past have seen superannuation funds provide a greater number of 
investment options for members in concert with greater flexibility to “switch” between 
these options. 
 
Many superannuation funds allow members to select from a range of “single-sector” 
options (Australian shares, international shares, property, Australian bonds, 
international bonds and cash) and “blended” options (capital stable, conservative 
balanced, balanced, growth and high growth). This enables members to tailor their 
investment decisions on the basis of their preferences toward risk and reward. 
Moreover, superannuation fund providers are serving an important facilitation role, 
allowing members to engage in dynamic strategies through switching arrangements. A 
small number of funds will allow members to switch between options on a daily basis; 
however, most providers will, on a member’s instruction, facilitate monthly switching 
(typically, the first switch in a 12-month period is free, with subsequent switches each 
charged an administration fee of around $20–$30).
2 As a result, the superannuation 
system now provides unprecedented flexibility (through increased investment choice 




This motivates the research question considered in this paper: What are the impacts (if 
any) of members utilising these product features? More specifically, what are the 
impacts of switching between various investment options? In the finance literature, 
notions of “switching” are considered attempts by members to engage in “market 
timing” and “investment options” linked to the issue of portfolio selection or asset 
allocation. In fact, standard finance theory places asset allocation at the heart of the 
investment management process (Markowitz 1952, Tobin 1958), with empirical studies 
suggesting that asset allocation may explain, on average, around 90% of the variation 
in total plan return (Brinson et al 1986).  
 
This study follows the analysis of Bauer and Dahlquist (2001) in considering switching as 
attempts made to maximise returns by making decisions about whether to be “in” or 
“out” of particular investment options. For instance, members who switch may make 
monthly, quarterly or annual decisions about whether to be in single-sector options 
(such as Australian shares or property) or various blended options (such as capital-
stable or high-growth), or seek the safe harbour of investing in cash. While a number of 
other studies (including Drew and Stanford 2003, Faff et al 2005, Frino et al 2005) 
specifically consider the impact of fund performance in the Australian superannuation 





 The allure of increasing portfolio returns through switching has attracted some of the 
leading researchers in the field to consider the problem. From the Nobel laureate William 
F. Sharpe’s (1975) recommendation that investors “should probably avoid attempts to 
time the market altogether” (p. 67), to Jeffrey’s (1984) paper entitled “The Folly of 
Stock Market Timing” and the recent conclusion of Bauer and Dahlquist (2001) that 
“market timing is a tough game” (p. 37), the received position suggests that market 
timing is at best difficult, and at worst a “wealth hazard” for fund members.
4 This study 
considers issues of switching from the perspective of a superannuation member by 
evaluating the merits of various switching strategies versus a more passive buy-and-
hold strategy. The work of Bauer and Dahlquist (2001) commonly termed the “roulette 
wheel” (RW) or “normalised ranked return” approach provides the basis for the analysis 
undertaken. This approach provides members with some positive insights into how even 
relatively infrequent decisions to switch between investment options can have 
substantial impacts on portfolio returns. The roulette wheel analogy is apt, given that 
we will explore the impacts of switching using many spins of a “fair” roulette wheel. This 





This discussion begins with a summary of Bauer and Dahlquist’s (2001) RW approach, 
examining switching decisions across two investment options (stocks and bonds) over 
three periods. We assume that 100% is invested by the member in either of the options 
and, for simplicity; the issue of compounding has been ignored. Assume that the returns 
by period were: 1 (stocks = 5.0%, bonds = 0.6%); 2 (stocks = -3.0%, bonds = 0.8%); 
and, 3 (stocks = 7.0%, bonds = 0.7%). With two investment options from which to 
select (denoted by “s”) over three periods (denoted by “n”), the total number of return 




Table 1: Illustrative Return Paths 















1  Stocks  5.0 Stocks  -3.0 Stocks  7.0  9.0 
2  Stocks  5.0 Stocks  -3.0 Bonds  0.7  2.7 
3  Stocks  5.0 Bonds  0.8 Stocks  7.0  12.8 
4  Stocks  5.0 Bonds  0.8 Bonds  0.7  6.5 
5  Bonds  0.6 Stocks  -3.0 Stocks  7.0  4.6 
6  Bonds  0.6 Stocks  -3.0 Bonds  0.7  -1.7 
7 Bonds 0.6  Bonds 0.8  Stocks  7.0  8.4 
















 TABLE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE RW CALCULATIONS 













6 Bonds  Stocks  Bonds  -1.7  1 0.000 
8  Bonds Bonds Bonds  2.1  2  0.143 
2  Stocks Stocks Bonds  2.7  3  0.286 
5 Bonds  Stocks  Stocks  4.6  4  0.429 
4 Stocks  Bonds  Bonds  6.5  5  0.571 
7  Bonds Bonds Stocks  8.4  6  0.714 
1  Stocks Stocks Stocks  9.0  7  0.857 
3 Stocks  Bonds  Stocks  12.8  8 1.000 
      Average 0.500 
 
In this example, the optimal path (path 3) resulted in a return of 12.8%, with the worst 
strategy, path (path 6), earning -1.7%. Following Bauer and Dahlquist (2001), the 
possible returns paths are then ranked in ascending order and a normalised measure 
based on the ranks is computed.
5 The formula for the normalised rank (or RW measure) 
is: 
 
If Rank = number of possible paths, then, RW = 1.000. 
If Rank = 1, then RW = 0.000. 
Otherwise, RW = (Rank - 1)/ (Number of Possible Paths - 1). 
  
The calculations in Table 2 illustrate Bauer and Dahlquist’s (2001) roulette wheel 
approach. The wheel is arranged to have only two possible outcomes with equal 
probability, one or zero, where the expected value of the game (or comparison across 
investment combinations) is 0.500. In this game of chance, the wheel decides whether 
to switch “in” or “out” of stocks, which determines the total return (in this example, over 
three periods). The key to the RW measure is the expected value of 0.500 over a large 
number of trials, as this is the value the member would expect over a large number of 
randomly chosen switches or investment paths (Bauer and Dahlquist 2001). From this 
foundation, we can extend the model to consider more real-world applications in the 
context of the increasing amount and complexity of choice offered to Australian 
retirement savers. 
 
In this study, we examine monthly switching strategies across various investment 
pairing options versus a buy-and-hold or passive approach. We can think of the buy-
and-hold strategy as the “measured asset” competing against various “switching asset 
combinations” and undertake comparative analysis on this basis.
6 In our stylised 
example, we could think of path 1 (stocks, stocks, stocks) and path 8 (bonds, bonds, 
bonds) in Tables 1 and 2 as measured assets or a buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
As with previous studies (Sharpe 1974, Jeffrey 1984, Droms 1989, Krester 1990, Bauer 
and Dahlquist 2001), we commence our analysis across single-sector options faced by 
members against a cash option using Australian T-bills as a proxy. To extend the 
boundaries of previous investigation, we also consider switching against blended or 
multi-sector options, again against a cash option. Finally, we explore a common strategy 
used by members and professional fund managers alike, switching between Australian 
equities and Australian T-bills, to quantify the impact of switching on future accumulated 







We use monthly returns from January 1985 to December 2005 (a total of 252 monthly 
observations) for domestic (Australian T-bills, bonds, property, and equities) and global 
(international bonds and equities) investment opportunities.
7 The summary statistics for 
each of these six single-sector investment options are provided in Table 3. Unlike 
previous work in this field, we include the property asset class in the analysis; previous 
studies have typically focused on just stocks and bonds. In addition to these single 
options, a return series of popular blended options (on the basis of growth/income mix) 
was also generated for the purposes of analysis (again, previous work has largely 
considered switching between single-sector options). These descriptive statistics are 
also reported in Table 3.
8 All statistics are expressed in months (unless otherwise 
specified), are expressed in Australian dollar terms and invoke the assumption of perfect 
capital markets (in particular, no transactions costs).
9  
 


















A: Single-sector options 
AUST.  T-BILL  0.6866 0.4893 0.3548 1.6038  0.3477 8.2389 
AUST.  BONDS  0.8574 0.9237 1.6956 7.3583  -5.5286  10.2886 
AUST.  PROP  0.7439 0.5799 1.0923 4.5151  -5.5143  8.9272 
AUST 
EQUITIES 
1.0772 1.4778 5.2561 14.2212  -54.7030  12.9259 
INTL  BONDS 0.8353 0.9510 2.7289 10.1802  -9.9808  10.0231 
INTL. 
EQUITIES 
0.8972 1.4690 4.2917 11.2340  -19.5883  10.7665 
B: Blended options 
CAP.  STABLE 0.7847 0.8097 1.7570 5.9863  -7.3822  9.4164 
CONS.  BAL.  0.8348 0.9297 2.2226 7.4763  -12.1159  10.0177 
BALANCED  0.8626 0.9876 2.4499 8.3388  -14.3895  10.3511 
GROWTH  0.8847 1.0283 2.6470 9.0592  -16.6624  10.6163 
HIGH  GROWTH  0.8485 0.9346 2.1089 8.4871  -7.3095  10.1824 
 
 
TABLE 4: AVERAGE ANNUAL RWs USING MONTHLY TIMING FOR NON-OVERLAPPING PERIODS, 
1985–2005 





A: Single-sector options 
AUST. BONDS  AUST. BONDS  AUST. T-BILL  0.6388 
AUST. PROPERTY  AUST. PROPERTY  AUST. T-BILL  0.6609 
AUS. EQUITIES  AUS. EQUITIES  AUST. T-BILL  0.6344 
INTL. BONDS  INTL. BONDS  AUST. T-BILL  0.5695 
INTL. EQUITIES  INTL. EQUITIES  AUST. T-BILL  0.6109 
B: Blended options 
CAPITAL STABLE  CAPITAL STABLE AUST.  T-BILL  0.6395 
CON. BALANCED  CON. BALANCED AUST.  T-BILL  0.6486 
BALANCED BALANCED AUST.  T-BILL  0.6447 
GROWTH GROWTH AUST.  T-BILL  0.6396 





Table 5: Average Annual RWS using Monthly Timing for Overlapping periods, 1985–2005 





A: Single-sector options 
AUST. BONDS  AUST. BONDS  AUST. T-BILL  0.6411 
AUST. PROPERTY  AUST. PROPERTY  AUST. T-BILL  0.6614 
AUST. EQUITIES  AUST. EQUITIES  AUST. T-BILL  0.6177 
INTL. BONDS  INTL. BONDS  AUST. T-BILL  0.5711 
INTL. EQUITIES  INTL. EQUITIES  AUST. T-BILL  0.5933 
B: Blended options 
CAPITAL STABLE  CAPITAL STABLE AUST.  T-BILL  0.6404 
CON. BALANCED  CON. BALANCED AUST.  T-BILL  0.6325 
BALANCED BALANCED AUST.  T-BILL  0.6228 
GROWTH GROWTH AUST.  T-BILL  0.6153 





We discuss RW measures for monthly switching between two assets (versus the 
“measured” or buy-and-hold investment option) over a one-year period, from 1985 to 
2005. The cost of estimating the normalised rank return is a computational expense due 
the exponential nature of the problem. For each one-year period, there are a total  or 
4,096 investment options between, say, Australian bonds and Australian T-bills. This is 
then calculated across rolling yearly windows commencing at January 1985 to December 
1985, February 1985 to January 1986, continuing to December 2005 (a total of 241 
rolling windows). The procedure is then repeated ten times (five single-sector and five 
blended options), resulting in just under ten million (9,871,360) RW measures being 
computed. The average annual results from strategies involving switching between the 
ten investment options and Australian T-bills (always set as the second switching asset) 
are presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
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These results provide preliminary insights into the challenge faced by members (or fund 
managers) attempting to optimise portfolio returns through switching between 
investment options. By way of illustration, it would be ideal to move into the relative 
safe harbour of Australian T-bills during periods when the Australian stock market is in 
negative territory (the third pairing in Tables 3 and 4). Over the period considered in 
this study (January 1985 to December 2005), the Australian equities investment option 
recorded negative returns in 89 of 252 months (around 35%). In Table 4 we computed 
the normalised rank return, or RW measure, for all possible monthly switches between 
Australian equities and Australian T-bills for each of the 21 years between 1985 and 
December 2005. An average for all 21 years is provided in the final column of Table 4. 
The results suggest that a buy-and-hold strategy of allocating all funds to the Australian 
equities option achieved a better return than 63% of all possible paths achievable 
through switching. These results corroborate the findings of previous studies, such as 
Bauer and Dahlquist (2001), suggesting that simply holding a diversified portfolio of US 
equities beats two-thirds of any monthly timing strategies involving US equities and US 
T-bills. Panel B in Tables 4 and 5 provides results of switching between blended options 
 
 
 and cash. These results corroborate the findings from this and previous studies that 
have only considered single-sector options, reporting a range of 0.6099–0.6486. Using 
the “fair-coin” analogy, the ten buy-and-hold strategies for the period 1985 to 2005 
were found to be superior, with results ranging from 0.5695–0.6614.  
 
One of the interesting findings that Bauer and Dahlquist (2001) report is that, for single-
sector options, “the annual variability of the RW measure is striking” (p. 38). To further 
the discussion, we consider the results for single-sector options (Table 6), and then turn 
to blended options (Table 7). 
 






BALANCED GROWTH  HIGH 
GROWTH 
1985  0.7133 0.9350 0.9707 0.9761 0.9885 
1986  0.8261 0.9201 0.9504 0.9612 0.9712 
1987  0.4850 0.4989 0.4989 0.4987 0.4969 
1988  0.5248 0.6830 0.7087 0.7346 0.6860 
1989  0.3783 0.4361 0.4601 0.4698 0.4725 
1990  0.1087 0.0298 0.0210 0.0181 0.0283 
1991  0.9810 0.9043 0.8396 0.7819 0.8786 
1992  0.4940 0.2242 0.1463 0.1082 0.1592 
1993  0.9873 0.9795 0.9702 0.9631 0.9690 
1994  0.0823 0.1521 0.2059 0.2501 0.2562 
1995  0.9875 0.9712 0.9346 0.9006 0.8694 
1996  0.6466 0.7145 0.7724 0.7910 0.8017 
1997  0.8576 0.7661 0.7155 0.7018 0.6835 
1998  0.8830 0.8354 0.7880 0.7609 0.7165 
1999  0.2291 0.6420 0.7839 0.8447 0.8703 
2000  0.8535 0.5553 0.3988 0.3101 0.1641 
2001  0.4571 0.4618 0.4430 0.4232 0.3287 
2002  0.5792 0.1382 0.1057 0.1009 0.0842 
2003  0.6440 0.8908 0.9287 0.9404 0.9336 
2004  0.9101 0.9802 0.9890 0.9905 0.9834 
2005  0.8020 0.9021 0.9077 0.9067 0.8552 
Average  0.6395 0.6486 0.6447 0.6396 0.6284 
NB: With Aust. T-bills as the second switching asset. 
 
One of the striking outcomes for the Australian setting is the results for the Australian 
property and Australian T-bill pair. For instance, in 1986 and 1989, around half of all 
market timing strategies worked. However, during the property market crash of the 
early 1990s (1991 and 1992), the optimal strategy was to have a zero weighting to 
property, and in the four years from 2001, the optimal strategy was 100% weighting to 
property. Yet, even with these widely fluctuating fortunes through time, a simple buy-
and-hold strategy of Australian property performed better than 63% of all possible 
active switching strategies. 
 
Turning to the respective buy-and-hold blended options, even with their vast array of 
asset composition (ranging from capital stable with 20:80 growth/income mix, to high 
growth holding 100% equities), we find years where the challenge of switching ranges 
from simple (in 1990, around 98% of all market timing strategies worked), to the near 
impossible (in 2004, less than 9% of all active switching strategies were successful 
across the five single-sector investment options, with less than 1% against the growth 
strategy). Sharpe’s (1975) analysis suggests that the investor would require around 70–
 
 
 80% forecast accuracy for switching to work, with the results of this study corroborating 
this view for both the single-sector and blended options against cash. 
 
IT’S TIME IN, NOT TIMING, THE MARKET THAT COUNTS 
 
These findings raise a number of issues for further analysis. For instance, the timing of 
switches could be moved at a different frequency, or the measured asset could be 
changed. These issues have been examined by Bauer and Dahlquist (2001) at a single-
sector level for the US. They found that, regardless of permutation, the buy-and-hold 
strategy consistently outperformed around two-thirds of any possible switching strategy. 
 
While the difficulty of beating a buy-and-hold strategy through switching is well known, 
it is argued that further consideration in quantifying the impacts from a risk/reward 
perspective is warranted. In short, we conclude with a test of the widely held belief that 
“it’s time in, not timing, the market that counts”. We present RW measures for monthly 






Figure 1: RW Measures for Buy-and-Hold Australian Equities Strategy versus Australian Equities and 

































 FIGURE 2: ACCUMULATED VALUE OF $10,000 FROM BUY-AND-HOLD AUSTRALIAN EQUITIES 
STRATEGY VERSUS AUSTRALIAN EQUITIES AND AUSTRALIAN T-BILLS 
SWITCHING, 1985–2005 
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The normalised ranked return measures plotted in Figure 1 fails to present a clear trend, 
with the RW measure oscillating between a maximum value of 0.9966 (2004) and a 
minimum value of 0.0239 (1990). As reported earlier, the buy-and-hold strategy again 
has a substantial advantage over all possible switching strategies (0.6344). To provide 
some context to the estimated RW measures, we revisit all possible switching strategies 
over this period (that is, 4,096 per annum, over 21 non-overlapping periods), repeating 
these investment paths annually through time. Using annualised data for the period 
between 1985 and 2005, the Australian equities investment option recorded a return of 
12.93% pa (std dev. 16.26%), with Australian T-bills returning 8.24% pa (std dev. 
4.23%). In previous research, the impacts of compounding have been ignored. Here, a 
compounding approach is used. We assume $10,000 is invested at January 1985 and 
compounded annually for 21 years. The crediting rate is calculated based on each of the 
4,096 possible investment combinations repeated annually between Australian equities 
and Australian T-bills. To estimate a future accumulated value, these returns are then 
credited at the end of December each year until the end of 2005. No additional 
contributions are assumed to be made over the period and switching costs are assumed 
to be nil. 
 
The impact of switching in Figure 2 is considered from an accumulated balance 
perspective. The range of accumulated values is from $24,765 for the worst possible 
combination of monthly switching, to $198,353 for those skilled (or lucky) enough to 
select the optimal combination. The buy-and-hold strategy of Australian equities is a 
top-quintile performer, resulting in a final balance of $103,606. Interestingly, just 
holding Australian T-bills (an investment option returning little more than 8% per 
annum over the observation period) was superior to more than 20% of all possible 
switching options! The impact of switching resulted in average returns in the range 
5.29%–15.88% pa and standard deviations fluctuating from 4.08% to 18.39%. The 
results presented in Figure 2 suggest that even occasional attempts to switch in and out 
of the Australian equities market (without forecast accuracy of around 70%) may result 
in substantial downward revisions of estimated future accumulated balances of 
retirement savings. In short, the empirical findings of this study corroborate the 
statement “it’s time in, not timing, the market that counts”. In fact, the advantage 






From a superannuation fund member perspective, the move by fund providers to offer 
greater product features allows members to tailor portfolios that reflect their individual 
risk/reward preferences and investment horizon. These research findings have 
implications for current superannuation issues, such as the default investment option 
(with the question not necessarily being “what is the default option” but, alternatively, 
“what is the consistency of the default option through time”) and lifecycle investing. The 
results may also provide opportunities for superannuation funds to be managed more 
efficiently: if members are switching regularly, this affects fund flows and may result in 
the fund holding sub-optimal levels in cash to cover any liquidity issues arising from 
switching. Finally, there is the need for research of this nature to move away from an 
“all or none” approach (that is, all in or all out of a particular investment option) and 
investigate switching at the margin. An immediate question that requires consideration 
is the use of the RW measure to model the impact of short-term tactical asset allocation 







1 Mercer Human Resource Consulting Pty Ltd estimates that, from July 2005, about 5.2 
million employees in Australia have the opportunity to switch their superannuation fund 
provider as a result of changes in the legislation 
(http://www.mercerwealthsolutions.com.au/news/subject/58/1112/). 
 
2 In addition, depending on the type of product, the member may also incur a buy-sell 
spread when switching between investment options. 
 
3 For instance, SunSuper provides five investment types ranging from “Conservative” to 
“Aggressive”; UniSuper offers seven types; and QSuper offers four “Ready Made 
Options” and four “Your Choice” options. 
 
4 Other influential studies in this debate were contributed by Droms (1989), Krester 
(1990), Beebower and Varikooty (1991), and Becker et al (1999). 
 
5 An important note in the specification of the RW measure is provided by Bauer and 
Dahlquist (2001), who provide a competing definition of RW of the form 
n
k
, where k is 




 to 1, not 0 to 1.  Bauer and Dahlquist (2001) provide a balanced 
discussion critiquing the relative merits of both approaches, arguing that the original 
definition of RW (in the manuscript) has “an advantage because it gives a consistent 
value of comparison even when the number of time periods is small” (p. 38). 
 
6 Following Bauer and Dahlquist (2001), the measured asset may be “stocks” and the 
switching assets may be “stocks” and “bonds”. The returns from “stocks” as the 
 
 
 measured asset are measured against the set of all possible returns based on the two 
switching assets.  The normalised rank return for the measured asset is the RW 
measure for that particular measured asset/switching asset combination. Consider the 
extreme example of monthly switching choices between two assets — there are  , or 
4,096, possible investment paths.  The optimal path has a RW rank of 1, the worst 
performing path ranking 0, and the third strategy of buy-and-hold, assuming that this 
option is neither the best or worst path, will be one of the remaining 4,094 paths.  This 
rationale is used to consider the merits (or otherwise) of members switching across 
various investment options versus a more passive buy-and-hold approach. 
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7 Turning specifically to each of the return series, we used: Australian T-bill Rate (3-
month T-bill rate from 1973 to November 1991, then 1-month T-bill from November 
1991 to December 2005; Australian Equities (from 31 December 1949 to 31 
December 1973 we used the Global Financial Data Australian Total Return Index based 
on historical ASX index data, from 31 December 1973 to 31 December 1979 we used 
the Corrected Statex Actuaries Accumulation Index and from 31 December 1979 to 31 
December 2005 we used the ASX/S&P All-Ordinaries Accumulation Index); Australian 
Bonds (Andex Bond Accumulation Index from 31 December 1949 to 31 December 
1976, CBA Bond Accumulation Index from 31 December 1976 to 30 September 1989, 
UBS All Composite Bond Accumulation Index from 30 September 1989 to 31 December 
2005); Australian Property (Mercer Unlisted Property Fund Index is employed from 
1973 to 2005 — n.b., this index is dominated by commercial and retail property); 
World Equities (we used the MSCI All Country World Equities Index); and World 
Bonds (from 31 December 1972 to 31 December 2005 we used the Lehman Brothers 
US Government Long Term Bond Index). 
8 Growth/Income asset mix (%): Capital Stable (achieve returns at least 2.0% p.a. 
more than CPI, 20/80); Conservative Balanced (achieve returns at least 2.5% p.a. 
more than CPI, 50/50); Balanced (achieve returns at least 3.0% p.a. more than CPI, 
70/30); Growth (achieve returns at least 4.0% p.a. more than CPI, 85/15); and High 
Growth (achieve returns at least 4.5% p.a. more than inflation, assuming shares only, 
100/0). 
 
9 Note 5 provides a description of the time series returns from the various indices used 
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